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Hungary After Orbán: The Defeat of Illiberal Democracy and Lessons for the United States

What does Hungary’s recent political transformation reveal about the possibilities of defeating democratic backsliding? In this episode of International Horizons, John Torpey speaks with Kim Lane Scheppele, Lawrence S. Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton University, about Viktor Orbán’s rise and the construction of Hungary’s illiberal democracy and the political movement that ultimately challenged his rule.

Scheppele examines how aspiring autocrats use legal mechanisms to weaken democratic institutions, consolidate power, and reshape the state from within. She also discusses Péter Magyar’s successful opposition campaign, highlighting the role of grassroots organizing, social media, anti-corruption politics, and broad political coalitions. Drawing parallels with developments in the United States, the conversation explores what Hungary’s experience can teach us about resisting democratic erosion and rebuilding democratic institutions.

Transcript

John Torpey — 00:05

Until recently, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary was for a number of years something like the offshore center of far-right conservative activism in the United States, providing the stage for a number of CPAC gatherings over the years. That’s the Conservative Political Action Committee, while Orbán was in power, Hungary provided an example of what he called illiberal democracy in Europe. But back in April, Orbán was taken down by anti-corruption campaigner Péter Magyar, who mounted a hugely successful grassroots effort to drive Orbán from office. The election generated tremendous popular enthusiasm and offered a model of how to beat illiberal democracies. It is hardly—it is still the early days of the new government. But where are things going so far, and what are the implications for other countries, not least our own United States. To address these issues, we’re fortunate to have with us today Kim Lane Scheppele, who is the Lawrence S. Rockefeller Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton University. Professor Scheppele’s research examines the rise and fall of constitutional government. After 1989, she moved to Eastern Europe, living in Hungary and Russia for extended periods, studying the way new constitutions were being enacted and entrenched. After the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, she studied the way democracies have come under stress, particularly those who are elected on populist political platforms and who then use the law to undermine constitutional institutions. This may sound familiar to an American audience. In 2016, Scheppele was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has served as president of the Law and Society Association during 2017 to 2019. Thanks so much for joining us today, Kim Lane Scheppele.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 02:15

Lovely to be here.

John Torpey — 02:16

Thanks for doing this. So maybe to get started, you could discuss a bit about how Viktor Orbán came to power. He was once a dissident in the days of the communist regime. What issues he emphasized on his way to taking power, and what he meant by this funny term, illiberal democracy.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 02:39

Yeah. So, Viktor Orbán actually didn’t just come to power in 2010 for the first time. He actually became prime minister of Hungary in 1998 when he was in his 30s. I mean, he’s only 65 now, right? So, he still has some time to come back a third time. Anyway, he came to power in 2010 in the middle of the financial crisis and its aftermath, the Hungarian government that preceded him had gone bankrupt on its watch. The IMF had come in and insisted that Hungary engage in an austerity program. Those things are never popular, and so when the election of 2010 came along, it was pretty clear that the socialist liberal bloc was not going to win, and the primary alternative, because Hungary by that time was mostly a two block system, was Orbán and his Fidesz party. Now, that meant in the 2010 election he got 53 percent of the vote. There were actually multiple smaller parties, but under the Hungarian constitutional system, which was designed in 1990 when they thought they were going to have a lot more political parties, under that system, it turned out that a single two-thirds vote of the parliament could amend the constitution and change any law, and there was a disproportionate election law that meant that Orbán’s 53% in 2010 gave him 67% of the seats in the parliament. Right, and those two combinations meant that you know Orbán’s two-thirds majority could just change the constitution at will. It meant that he was basically above the law, and so they started on this rampage? You know, first year, 12 constitutional amendments changing 60 articles of the Constitution. After one year, they introduced a new Constitution, wholly new Constitution as an amendment to the old one. This was accompanied by 1000s of pages of laws that adjusted the new constitution to the Hungarian legal order. In the midst of all of that, if you looked at the pattern of the laws, it turned out that they were all designed to capture every political institution in the hands of Orbán’s allies and to entrench him in power. For the long haul, so this was autocratic capture by legalism, right? And the reason why that matters is because this is actually the pattern we’re seeing among lots of autocrats these days. There aren’t that many coups, yes, in the coup belt in Africa, but you know, in most established democracies, what you’re seeing is aspirational autocrats coming to power and then changing the laws legally in order to entrench themselves in power. Okay, now Orbán was caught out doing all of that, and the European Union, of which Hungary is a member, Council of Europe, which has the European Court of Human rights. They started calling Orbán out on all of this, and he defended himself by saying, “Well, we’re still a democracy. You know, we may be an illiberal democracy, but we are a democracy.” And then, of course, there was a whole debate: “What is an illiberal democracy? Is that a contradiction in terms?” And Orbán tried to rescue that because he realized it was kind of a bit of a rhetorical mistake because it sounded bad, right? So, he tried out a whole bunch of different alternatives, and he wound up with, well, you know, Christianity is illiberal because Christianity doesn’t just tolerate every other religion; it has its own values and so on, and so he wound up converting his rhetorical misstep of illiberal democracy into we are the defenders of Christian Europe, Hungary for Hungarians. What we mean by this is that not everybody is welcome here, not everybody is to be included in our democracy because we are Hungarian and we are Christian, so anyway, he winds up anchoring this new form of conservatism in the EU, from which you start to see the spread of all of that, including here, because the Trump folks trying to figure out how to come to power and keep power have consulted Viktor Orbán and his team very often, but I think we’re going to get into that.

John Torpey — 07:05

Yes, well, that was certainly something I was interested in: is the kind of role that Hungary played, at least for a while, as this kind of epicenter of conservative reaction. I’m not sure what term we should use, and I think I want to get back to the other point you made, which is that overthrows of governments have declined. I mean, there’s a coup belt, as you say, in Africa. Occasionally happens in East in South America anymore, but it’s not the kind of typical way of overthrowing or changing a government undemocratically anymore. So, I’ll be interested to get back to that. But first of all, let’s let’s talk about the illiberal democracy business.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 07:51

Yeah. So, so illiberal democracy is something that hides underneath what looks like a conventional democracy. So, the leaders come to power through free and fair elections, at least the first time, and then what they do is they keep the facade of democratic institutions while hollowing them out from behind. So, for example, one of the first things that autocrats typically do is they try to capture the judiciary. They often do that by legally changing the appointments process, or by legally installing onto the court judges who will agree with this kind of illiberal democratic vision. If the court, which is the thing that can say whether what a government’s doing is unconstitutional, is sort of hardwired to say that everything this government does is constitutional, you’re off to the races, right? And then it’s a matter of capturing the other institutions. You can change them legally. So, for example, one of Orbán’s tricks was to create, to take an institution that he didn’t like, create a parallel one, saying we have to modernize this. So, we’re going to create a new version of this institution, and then you cancel the old one while you’re filling the new one with all of your own people. Okay, so Orbán did that weirdly with the Supreme Court in Hungary, where they created, they renamed it, they gave it its medieval name all over again. Orbán was great at renaming things, and then they said, “Okay, all the judges have to meet new standards.” And then the new standards didn’t look that terrible, actually. If you read through them, they were things that you could imagine any judge in any sane democracy would have to have. One of those criteria was that you had to have been a judge in Hungary for five years before you could be named to the Supreme Court, right? Makes perfect sense. When they ran all the old judges through the new criteria, one judge was disqualified. A guy called András Baka. He happened to be president of the court, and the reason why he was disqualified was that he’d only been at the Supreme Court for three years. Before that. He had spent 17 years as a judge on the European Court of Human Rights, okay, which was not a court in Hungary, so therefore he was disqualified. That’s how they opened up the presidency of the court and could install their own person, right? I mean, I could go through a million examples like this, but you get the idea, right? Under cover of what looks like perfectly reasonable criteria, new institutions reshuffling. Everything looks fine on the surface, but underneath it, what they’re doing is capturing all of the organs of state. They capture the prosecution service, the election office, the state audit office. You know, they managed to install a kind of discipline at the parliament, so that opposition parties who spoke out were fined for disorderly conduct. You know, and so by the time you know, it was took only about three years for them to consolidate control over every single institution in the country. You know, and by that time, and then the final coup de grâce, right, is where they actually change the election law, so that by the time Orbán came up for re-election in 2014, you know, he they gerrymandered the country, they fiddled with a lot of the election rules again, borrowing rules from other so-called good democracies, but putting them together in such a way that the election could have only one possible outcome. By the way, I’ve called this thing where that you take perfectly good rules from different countries and combine them to make this kind of dictatorship. I’ve called this the Frankenstein, right? If you remember, you know Mary Shelley’s, you know Frankenstein. By the way, was of course the monster, right? The monster that he makes, he digs up bodies and he attaches the torso of one to the head of another. To the these were all normal bodies on normal people, but you put them together and they make a monster. So that’s the metaphor, right?

To figure out how they do this, and it becomes very difficult for outsiders to figure out what’s wrong with the system, because as soon as you criticize something, they say, “Oh well, the Netherlands does it that way, and Germany does it this way, and the U.S. invented gerrymandering. It’s still a democracy. So what?” You know, and you put them all together, and Orbán then stole the 2014, 18, and 22 elections.

John Torpey — 12:18

So, I’m sort of inclined to ask: Is this an improvement over people shooting their way into power? I mean, you know, misdirection and lying and cheating may not be good, but maybe it’s better than people who are, you know, riding into the Capitol on jeeps with machine guns on the back of the jeep.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 12:41

Yeah, I mean, it’s. I mean, look, legality beats force any time. The problem is that illegality or that legality is not necessarily liberal, right? If by liberal you mean that people can throw the bums out when they get sick of their government, or that people have rights that they feel like are actually defended by public institutions, you know those kinds of things are no longer guaranteed. But yes, I mean the amount of force, violence, and death is really minimized. Orbán even perfected a system through which, for example, when they when they decided to capture the media, you know the old way of doing things. You know, you shoot your way in, or you force a closure of the media. You arrest the journalists. You know all that kind of stuff, which goes with you know the old coup mentality of how you take stuff over. What they did in Hungary was they created a media board that was supposed to assess whether the media were free and fair and balanced. If they determined the media were not providing balanced news coverage, which, by the way, usually meant giving Orbán’s side most of the airtime, but if the media were not being free and balanced, then they would fine the media these bankrupting fines. And of course, the media are all at this point. This is you know going on over the last 16 years, this is when the media everywhere in the world have been financially precarious because of the way that it’s been hard to monetize online, you know, news production. Anyway, so the media are weakened financially, and then Orbán’s oligarchs swoop in and buy them at bargain basement rates, and then the next thing you know, the media are singing a different song, and the media council is no longer finding them, even though their news is completely one-sided, right? So again, it’s this kinder, gentler legal way that nonetheless accomplishes this fact that you know everything is controlled by one governing party and by one political viewpoint,

John Torpey — 14:47

Right. In some ways, it seems like this is something Silvio Berlusconi really, in a lot of ways, pioneered. Yeah. You know, I mean, he owned a lot of the media himself. Which was a difference, but nonetheless, he sort of played fast and loose with the rules and ran the show off and on anyway for a lot of years.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 15:10

True, but you know there’s one big difference, and this is actually important in thinking about you know Berlusconi tried hard to create a dictatorship in Italy, and he was continuously reelected. He was actually popular, but he never really created this dictatorship. And the question is, you know, what did Italy have that Hungary didn’t have? And the answer is basically complexity. You know, Berlusconi tried to capture the constitutional court. He tried to capture the ordinary judiciary, but the way that lawmaking happens in Italy is so complicated, and you know this is Italy’s famous national gridlock over everything. But it also prevented Berlusconi from really being able to capture all of these institutions. You know, so yes, he had the media, and yes, he was able to, you know, violate the law. But then what he did, because the legal system is, shall we say, also pretty complicated. He started, you know, what we’ve seen now with Donald Trump of just endlessly filing motions and postponing criminal trials, so that Berlusconi never, the law never caught up with him, you know. But still, Italy, you know, damaged, but not really, you know, it never fell into something we might think of as a real autocracy because the system was just too complicated. Two chambers of parliament elected on very different rules. You have to get a law passed by both chambers within the same term. That didn’t really happen. I mean, so there were just there’s a lot of regionalism. There’s a lot of other sort of cross-cutting political factors that just make it really hard to capture Italy, and that meant Italy survived Berlusconi as a democracy in more or less good standing. Hungary, on the other hand, had a unicameral parliamentary system, right? So, one chamber of parliament, prime minister is elected by that one chamber of parliament, the sort of figurehead president, also elected by the parliament, the constitutional judges also elected by the parliament. Right? You begin to see the system here. If you can get up to that constitutional majority in the parliament that enables you to amend the constitution at will, you can quickly control everything from that central dashboard, so it’s a kind of constitutional problem. And I might say, by the way, that Israel has exactly the same form of government as Hungary. You know, it’s the reason why the Netanyahu government tried to capture the courts because that was the one thing they couldn’t control, and they were only pushed back by massive public protest in the streets, but not by you know institutions that actually could hold them back. So, you know, these institutional structures really matter a lot, and the more complicated your system is, just the more veto players, the you know the difficulty of needing to capture institutions over multiple election cycles, things of that kind, good buffers from being captured by an autocrat.

John Torpey — 18:07

Right. I mean, the passage from your bio that I mentioned in the introduction is, I think, very telling. This business about sort of taking power in the most apparently legal fashion, but turning it into an illegal, essentially autocracy, and I mean, it’s it seems to me in political science, political sociology, in recent years, there’s been this, you know, ongoing effort to identify these different novel kind of more constitutional illiberal democracy and things like that, but they’re meant, you know, in a way to specify exactly what’s going on in a situation in which, as we were saying before, people aren’t shooting their way into power; they’re using perfectly legal mechanisms and stratagems to do that. So, are we going to see more of that in the coming years?

Kim Lane Scheppele — 19:00

Well, we’re seeing more of that, let’s you know. I know we let’s connect this a little bit to what’s happening in the U.S. So yes, we’re seeing this in the U.S. right now. And what interesting what we have here under Trump too is a bit of a combination of the shooting your way into power and the legalistic autocracy, as I’ve called it, so the shooting your way into power part is ICE bundling people off the streets and taking them away in unmarked vans, as well as starting illegal wars. I mean, there’s a big chunk of what Trump is up to that begins to look a little bit like old-fashioned coup plotters, right? It’s just violence in the street, terror terrorize people wherever they are, right? And so, all of that looks a little bit more like it’s on the cooish side of things, but the part that people aren’t paying enough attention to is what I think of as the Project 2025 Lane, and I don’t mean by that just the policies that people got excited about when this. All came out, but the methodology. This is the part that the Trump team borrowed from Viktor Orbán. Viktor Orbán’s people were involved in writing Project 2025, and when you read it, if you know how they captured power in Hungary, you see all of the parallels. So let me just mention one of them. When Orbán came to power, he’d spent a lot of time studying the national budget before he took office, and starting right at the beginning, they defunded everything suddenly overnight that would have been a base for someone to oppose him. Again, think of what happened, you know, in February of last year, when suddenly you know the Office of Management and Budget comes out with this memo and basically stops the funding of all of these independent institutions that might have been places where people could stand to push back against what they were doing. You know, it was of questionable legality, but the state followed this order because a guidance coming out of OMB is something bureaucrats recognize as a lawful act, right? And so, they stop the funding, even if they didn’t agree with it, even if they wondered, “Gee, is this really legal?” You know, because it comes in a legal form. And then what Russell Vought has been doing is shoveling a whole bunch of new regulations through the what’s called notice and comment period. So, this is again in U.S. law. There’s lawmaking done by Congress. Everybody learns how that works when they’re in grade school, but then once you have statutes that have been passed, they’re usually too general to be directly applied. And so, what happens? The next stage is for what’s called rulemaking, which is an executive branch lawmaking process through which the statute is made specific enough to give concrete directions to government officials about how they’re supposed to operate. That rulemaking process is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and enacted in 1930, what that requires is you publish the rule, you invite comment from the general public, you then address the comments that have been made, and then you publish the rule. Okay, the Office of Management and Budget has been publishing tons of rules, and we’ve generated tons of comments. Many of us to this process. They then ignore all the comments, publish the rule. Let me give you one example of stuff that’s sneaking through that process. By the way, when I say sneaking through the process, I mean how many people read the Federal Register? I mean, even political scientists don’t usually read the political the Federal Register. So, a lot of this is happening very quietly. These rules come out 200 pages of legalese, so people can’t really see what’s going on. But just to pick one topic, because it’s one of the ones I’m following closely, you know, we’ve seen that you know Trump’s attacks on universities, where they literally walk into a named university, say Harvard or Columbia, or now they’re after Yale. They walk into the university and say, you know, you’re discriminating against Jews, and therefore we’re going to take away all your science funding, or like whatever. Okay, and then the universities are sort of pressured into complying. Well, that’s been the retail version of what they’re doing to universities.

The wholesale version is going through this rulemaking process, and there’s a set of rules they’ve been putting in place gradually, one after another, that make it easier for new institutions to become accreditors of universities. Okay, and the accreditors of the new accreditors are soon going to be given the power to accredit, you know, or to say these universities are fine. Okay, now what are the standards of the new accreditors? The new accreditors are going to go around to universities saying, “Have you followed all of Trump’s executive orders?” And if not, you don’t get accredited. And if you do, then you do. Now, what’s at stake under the law that preceded Trump, the Department of Education first of all accredits the accreditors, and then when the accreditors accredit universities, it’s a green light for the Department of Education to signal that the universities that have been accredited are eligible for federal funds. No accreditation, no federal funds across the board. So, what they’re doing through the rulemaking process is setting up this whole alternative system of accreditation, so they can do wholesale to every single university what they’ve been doing retail in these specific attacks. Okay, now who’s paying attention? That’s going through in these technical 200 page rule, you know, rules and so on. That’s how Orbán did it in Hungary, right? Orbán did not do snatching people off the streets, violating international law, you know, performative violence, and all kinds of you know speeches that get the opposition all riled up. He. Very looked like a grown-up doing normal government. Instead, what Orbán did was what vote is doing. But all of this formal lawmaking comes across in intense legalese that the average person can’t understand, and in doing so, they completely rewire the whole system of government and the whole relationship of government to the civil sector, right? And so that accreditation example is just one, but this is happening across, you know, hundreds of rules that the Office of Management and Budget is issuing, and that journalists are not paying attention to, because frankly, it takes a lot of grit to figure out what they’re doing, and that’s exactly what happened in Hungary. Okay, so this is the part they really borrowed from Orbán, and it’s the part that I’m really most nervous about in the U.S. because those rules survive even if somebody else is elected. Next time they can dismantle them, but it takes a little while, and bureaucrats follow rules. You know, you tell them this is the law, and they’ll do it even if they disagree with it. Right? That’s how you entrench these kinds of legalistic autocratic forms.

John Torpey — 26:12

Right. Well, thanks for that very valuable, I think, dissection of how this process is working because it’s you know the Federal Register. I mean, I’ve looked at the Federal Register in my life. I think there was a time when the Federal Register was a lot shorter than it is now, so it was easy to you know read through the comments that were made. But that was a long time ago. But so, the question I want to ask though is really you know after a while, the Hungarians seem to have tired of this way of being ruled, and very recently, in April, they were essentially voted out of power, and by someone who was once a member is still a member of the party that Orbán was a member of.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 27:01

Was there’s been a hard break. Let’s say.

John Torpey — 27:02

yeah, yeah, it was a while ago but Orbán had a different background than we might have expected given his subsequent trajectory but so maybe you could tell us about you know what happened in this election why was there this huge groundswell what did that have to do with Péter Magyar and other explanation of you know why this election was so earth shattering.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 27:27

Yeah. So, one thing to always keep in mind is that every dictatorship ends eventually, and the question is how it ends. You know, and in Hungary, you know, Orbán came to power in 2010. What started to really expose his vulnerabilities were first of all the recognition that this was no longer a democracy in good standing. The EU in 2022 cut all the money that they gave to Hungary for development projects, and that was about 6% of Hungarian GDP. So that was really a substantial amount, and so, you know, that hit the Hungarian economy. There were also other reasons: Orbán’s corruption, because he was massively corrupt, not as visibly corrupt as Trump, but, you know, the richest people in the country were all of his closest friends. The richest man in Hungary is a guy with a grade school education, who was a plumber basically, you know, before, and he was Orbán’s best childhood friend, right? So you started to see the people around Orbán getting very, very wealthy, and you also started seeing that the EU was finally catching on to the fact that democracy had been severely damaged in Hungary, so between the cutoff of funds and the fact that they were stealing about a quarter to a third of all of the budget going out to contractors, meant that stuff stopped working. Right, so the hospitals were failing when the pandemic hit. Hungary had one of the highest per capita death rates in the world, which was disguised by the fact that they sent the military in to take over the hospitals, so the information wouldn’t get out. The hospitals were failing, the trains were failing, the school system was failing. All of that basically meant that the state was falling apart. So, when all of that starts happening, people notice your government’s not working, and Hungary is a very pro-EU state. So, when the EU cut funds, people said, “Oh, right, maybe we have to do something.” So out of this whole kind of financial crisis because it really hit people, you know. As our lives are no longer sustainable economically, this guy Péter Magyar jumps out of Orbán’s orbit. He, by the way, he wasn’t really a figure of any note in Orbán’s system, you know, before February of 2024, when he popped out of the woodwork, I don’t think most Hungarians had ever heard of him. But he came. He came out at the time that there was a pedophilia scandal, not involving Orbán himself or Magyar or any of these people. But the president of the country had pardoned a guy who had covered up a pedophilia ring in a state-sponsored school, and if you’re going to be Mr. Christian Europe, as Orbán was claiming, pardoning a pedophile is really not a good look, right? So, Orbán blamed the president, who was a woman, blamed the justice minister, who was in charge of pardons, the only other woman in Orbán’s cabinet, fired the two women, and then Péter Magyar comes out of nowhere and says, “How dare Orbán hide behind women’s skirts?” Okay, now because you can’t make this stuff up, the justice minister who was just fired was the woman from whom Péter Magyar at the time was getting an acrimonious divorce, right? And he comes out of their marriage with tapes because he’s recorded his wife’s dinner conversation, in which she exposes some of the corruption inside the Orbán government. Right? Somebody’s got to make a made-for-TV movie about this thing. Right?

John Torpey — 31:15

Very colorful.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 31:16

It’s very colorful, but you know it. But what it tells you is the tremendous, shall we say contingency of history, right? Like why this guy, and you know it could just be the divorce that did it. I mean, we just have no idea, right? But obviously, he comes out. He starts to expose Orbán’s corruption. He attracts audiences. He starts to travel around the country. People show up and they want to hear more about this. This happens in February that he becomes visible. He, by the way, by this time all the media are in Orbán’s hands. So, the opposition to Orbán they don’t have any TV, they don’t have any radio, they don’t own any of the big newspapers anymore. So, the opposition has generated a YouTube channel where Péter Magyar gets on the YouTube channel and gives a two-hour interview about all the dirt he saw while he was inside Orbán’s orbit, right? So, he’s credible because he knows this stuff firsthand. In June, there were the European Parliament elections, or maybe it was May, but anyway, just a few months later, European Parliament elections. He decides, gee, well, he cobbles together a political party, runs the political party in the European elections, and gets 1/3 of the vote out of nowhere. By the way, this kills all the traditional opposition parties because they get almost nothing. But Orbán basically gets two thirds, and Magyar get 1/3 of the seats, and suddenly he’s got this perch. He’s got a European salary because he’s on, he’s a member of the European Parliament himself, and he’s demonstrated in an election that’s run under European rules rather than under Orbán’s rules. European rules require proportional representation, which is exactly what Orbán’s rules don’t, right? And so, because of the proportional representation, he and his team get this toehold in the European Parliament, and with that, by the way, comes parliamentary immunity. Orbán tries to charge Péter Magyar with all these crimes that are sort of invented crimes, and they don’t go anywhere because of parliamentary immunity, and because Péter Magyar has a salary that’s coming from Europe, something Orbán can’t control. He’s bulletproof, basically. Anyway, yeah. So, I mean, just again, these kind of weird configurations. But for two years, he and then okay, so he then he decides he’s going to actually run for prime minister, which by the way you can’t. Nobody votes for prime minister in a parliamentary system, you vote for members of parliament, and the members of parliament elect the prime minister. But you know, if you vote for a particular party, that party will elect a particular candidate, right? So, he starts running for office, but because he comes from inside the system, he understands how the election system is rigged. Okay, and the election system is rigged so that a vote in the countryside counts for two to three times as much as any vote in the cities. I can explain in detail how that works. I wrote an article about it in the Journal of Democracy, but that’s basically the structure. Okay, and he realizes you have to win the countryside. It would be the equivalent. I mean, it’s like the Electoral College in the U.S., only even more tilted in the direction of giving extra votes to rural areas. So, he goes out to the countryside and he spends two years going to village to village to village, showing up again. He has no budget, right? He often drives a pickup truck into town, stands on the flatbed of the pickup truck and starts to give a speech, you know, and he winds up attracting the support of all of these discontent people, who didn’t realize how many other people were also discontent, because one effect of having this kind of autocratic government is that you know if you stick your head up. You know, suddenly your kid loses his job, or your parents’ pensions are cut, or like the government was using all those kinds of mechanisms to hold people in line, and suddenly you look around and half your neighbors are standing out in the public square listening to Péter Magyar. He doesn’t have a party, so what he does is he says to people, “Look. Now you look around. You see how many of your neighbors agree with you. So do something. Form a civic association and do something”.

And over the course of two, a little over two years, basically his group, his little tiny inner circle with no budget, right, and no media starts to organize these civic groups. By the end, there are something like 2500 civic groups across this country that is physically the size of Indiana, right? All these little groups, and the groups are linked by an app. Everybody’s communicating on Facebook, and basically they’re running a social media campaign around the edges of Orbán’s state-run media, you know. And so, when people say that social media have destroyed democracy, I always want to say, it depends, right? In this case, the opposition could never have gotten as far as it did without being able to mobilize social media, that was all they had. And when the election happened, all of these groups, by the way, the political parties called Tisza that Péter Magyar formed. It’s the name of a river in Hungary, and all these little civic groups were called the Tisza Islands. Okay, so the islands, when the election happens, the islands turn out in force, especially in these rural areas, and in the 2022 election, gerrymandered districts, everything else. There are 106 election districts in Hungary. In 2022, Orbán won 85 of the 106. In 2026, Peter Modier won 96 of the 106, which is to say he flipped these districts that had voted for Orbán for decades, and it was in person, it was social media, it was the fact that young people were actually running his social media campaign, not out of any particular central organization, but just out of the enthusiasm that you could have somebody else in charge, you know. And so, there’s a kind of recipe here that we’ve seen now reproduced in Serbia. Pieces of it have been reproduced in Brazil and Israel a bit since this has happened. But here’s the formula: brand new faces in politics that nobody’s ever seen before. That’s what happened in Serbia. Not so much Israel and Brazil. Okay, and then what you do is you, the campaign message, was neither left nor right. It was they’ve stolen all the money, and that’s why you can’t have nice things, right? It was linking corruption to the fact that state services don’t work. That was again. That was Serbia. That was you know Israel. That was Brazil. I mean, you know, under Bolsonaro actually. And this has been the message of some of the Democrats here in the U.S. I mean, I think of when I look at Jon Ossoff, for example, he looks and dresses and sounds like Péter Magyarr, it’s the white shirt rolled up at the sleeves. It’s the anti-corruption connected to this is why the state doesn’t work. I mean, it’s almost as Ossoff was borrowing a page from Péter Magyar’s book, right? So, it’s neither left nor right message, building a big tent. I mean, Péter Magyar had to switch all those votes on the countryside. These were conservative votes that had never voted for a liberal from Budapest ever before, okay. And so, big tent, and then you know, trying to mobilize young people, because young people with their social media skills can be the real engines of these campaigns. And when you’re on social media, now again, you know, it depends on who owns the platforms. I think that you know part of the reason why this worked in Hungary is that this is all happening in Hungarian. It’s all happening on Facebook. Mark Zuckerberg doesn’t read Hungarian, you know, so there wasn’t the kind of platform censorship that we saw, for example, in Brazil with Facebook actually, and that we saw here with the No Kings Day when Facebook just took down the pages of the No Kings organizers, right? So, you need social media companies to be to behave themselves, so they don’t censor this stuff. But young people have been the engines of all of these revolutions, and particularly, actually, in Brazil, where Lula, the sort of left wing guy who’s been, you know, prime minister, president of Brazil for a long time. He’s running again. He lost the first round of the election to the son of the prior autocrat, and then young people said, “Wait a second! We had three weeks between the first and second round to get it together and to get Lula to win” In those three weeks, they convinced Lula to get a cell phone for the first time and just start appearing on social media. And then they just took over the publicity campaign for the media and for the for the Lula campaign. And in three weeks, they flipped 10 million votes, but between new voters and old voters changing their minds. So, again, young people are the engines of this. You can’t rely on traditional media and traditional advertising. Big tent message: new faces. Young people are the engines, and that’s the recipe.

John Torpey — 40:37

It sounds like a recipe. In fact, it sounds like in many ways it was the predecessor of our own elections. So, I wonder how you would, what you would say about that, and what sorts of implications this pattern has for you know what we’re going to expect from the remainder of the Trump presidency for the next two years.

Kim Lane Scheppele — 41:00

Yeah, yeah. So, I was watching, of course, the elections here closely after seeing what happened in Hungary, and I think part of the democratic blue tsunami, or the blue tsunami, or whatever we’re calling it, is that many of those people who were elected were totally new faces, and I think this is a lesson going forward to the next presidential. If the Democratic Party just trots out people who have run for all of the past elections, who come out of the party machinery, who’ve been there forever, not a recipe for success. You need new faces. You need to build a big tent. Okay, that doesn’t mean the progressive wing doesn’t get something, right? This means that because I think if you campaign on, they’re stealing all the money, so therefore you can’t have nice things. There are conservative and progressive elements within that kind of message, but you’ve got to build a huge coalition because what we’ve learned from other elections where the autocrats get sort of voted out. This happened in Poland. Actually, it happened in Brazil when Lula won the first time after Bolsonaro. If you win elections by a narrow majority, you can’t change enough to really root out all the autocratic elements that the aspirational autocrat left behind. Remember, because if autocrats are doing this now, where they come in and then they change the rules and they capture the institutions and they change the nature of the state, it takes a while to uproot all of that stuff. And if you don’t have a big enough majority to pass ambitious laws that do that, then the veto players the autocrat leaves behind veto what the new democratic government does, and then they look ineffective, and then they lose. Okay, so to bring that home, the fact that Trump got three Supreme Court appointments, you know, two under shall we say irregular circumstances, meant that the Supreme Court was vetoing everything Biden was going to try to do that would have had immediate effect. The court let go everything that would have long term effects, you know, infrastructure, whatever. But things like student loans, you know, the Supreme Court did not allow Biden to have a victory that would have had a real meaningful effect while he was still in office, and so if you’ve got these veto players left in the system, when the pro-democrats do manage to win an election, what happens is they can’t do anything or they don’t look effective, and then because people wanted change and they didn’t get change, they go back to what the other alternatives were, and that’s very often bringing the autocrat back in, right? So, you need a very big election victory, and that’s where I’m really worried that the Democrats are not necessarily taking the right message from even from this overwhelming midterm victory. You know, I think a number of people have made the point. This was much more of a negative vote than a positive vote. The Democratic Party is about as popular as the Republican Party, and so there really has to be a remake of what the opposition to Trump looks like in order to be able to convince people that there’s a positive program there that will succeed in rooting out all of the autocratic capture elements that Trump’s put into the system, and that takes the rubble that’s left from, you know, the Trump destruction of American government, and doesn’t just try to repatch it together to look like it did before, but to do something actually innovative and creative, and you need that kind of inspiration, you know, in order to be able to generate the kind of enthusiasm that gives you big victories.

John Torpey — 44:55

Absolutely, I think a lot of people are seeing things the way you see them, but there’s clear. A fight going on for the control of the future of the Democratic Party, and we’ll just have to see how that plays out. But anybody who wants to think about it clearly should come back and listen to this podcast interview. I want to thank you, Kim Lane Scheppele of Princeton University, for taking the time to talk to us today about the collapse of Hungary’s illiberal democracy and the implications for the U.S. and elsewhere, I want to thank Sebastian Canseco Ibarra for his technical assistance and Duncan McKay for letting us use his International Horizons as the theme music for the show. This is John Torpey saying thanks for joining us, and we look forward to having you with us for the next episode of International Horizons.

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