In this episode of International Horizons, RBI director John Torpey interviews journalist Mattia Ferraresi about the implications of a potential second Trump presidency for European politics. Ferraresi discusses how Trump’s rhetoric and policies, including his stance on NATO and trade, might influence transatlantic relations. The conversation explores the rise of far-right nationalism in Europe, with a focus on Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s alignment with Trump and her emerging role as a key intermediary between the U.S. and the EU. Ferraresi also examines the growing power of far-right parties across Europe, their ideological networks, and their influence on EU policies. The episode concludes with an analysis of Trump’s trade policies and their potential impact on both Europe and his domestic base, raising critical questions about the direction of U.S.-EU relations in a shifting global landscape.

Transcript

John Torpey 

US. President Elect Donald Trump has made no secret over the years that he regards European governments as dead meats when it comes to paying for their fair share of the common defense provided through NATO and the American security umbrella. He has suggested that he might not honor the mutual defense commitment of NATO governments articulated in article five of the NATO Treaty. Trump has had, has at times treated Europeans with disdain, and recently encouraged Russian President Vladimir Putin to do, quote, whatever the hell he wants, unquote, to any NATO country that hasn’t paid what he thinks they should have paid. What should the Europeans expect from a second Trump presidency, and how should they respond? Welcome to International Horizons, a podcast of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies that brings scholarly and diplomatic expertise to bear on our understanding of a wide range of international issues. My name is John Torpey, and I’m director of the Ralph Bunche Institute at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and we’re fortunate to have with us today. Mattia Ferraresi, a journalist with the Italian publication Domani, which simply means “tomorrow.” He spent a decade as the US correspondent for the Italian newspaper Il Foglio, and held the prestigious Nieman fellowship in journalism at Harvard University in 2019. He’s published articles in The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Boston Globe Foreign Policy and the New York Times, where he recently published an op-ed highlighting the role of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni as a key figure mediating between the incoming American President and the European Union. He was also one of the first commentators in Italy to write about Trump in the media. Thanks for being with us today. Mattia Ferraresi.

Mattia Ferraresi 

Thanks for having me, John.

John Torpey 

Great to have you. So I do want to start with your op-ed in the New York Times earlier this week, which argued that notwithstanding her position as head of a party with openly fascist roots, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni had earned a special role in relations between the EU and the United States, and, more particularly, between President of the European Commission, or sort of underline, and incoming American president, Donald Trump. So maybe you could tell us a little bit about, you know, what you argued in that piece and what’s going on?

Mattia Ferraresi 

Yeah, sure. And I think stars are aligninging the right way for Meloni, partly for her own qualities and her own abilities, in terms of like doing politics, partly for circumstances. So I think when it comes to Trump and the affinity between Meloni and her government and Trump is pretty obvious. Is like both sort of far right nationalist and sort of they are clearly allies in terms of where they stand the world and by the way, the GOP has also an affiliation with the ECR, which is the party family that Meloni leads as a president at the European Union level. So there is also an institutional alliance there that has not to be overlooked. So this is pretty, it’s pretty obvious. What is less obvious is to have Germany and France, both in deep crisis, politically and so extremely weakened, and when it comes to Germany, even in an economic situation, evolving and being not in particularly good place. So you do have the traditional and most powerful states, nations in Europe that are not in the position to be sort of chief negotiators for the EU. So that opens up an opportunity for Meloni that she’s absolutely eager to grab, noting to that the relationship with the the EU. Keep in mind that Ursula von der Leyen has started her new mandate at the commission. At the EU Commission, Meloni did not support her bid for in order to be reelected when, when she campaigned. However, the political truth is that the EU Commission and Ursula von der Leyen in terms of policy, moved clearly rightward, and especially when it comes to immigration for sure and the defense of the borders, there’s no doubt about that. So there is a political alignment with the with the right, and even to some. Stances of the far right. And at the end of it, what we have right now is that the new EU Commission that just was inaugurated, like few weeks ago, is basically the most right wing EU Commission ever. And so you have that that places Meloni in a very, very good position to be absolutely, I think, a major partner for Trump administration when it comes to deal with Europe.

John Torpey 

Got it. So tell me a little bit more about Georgia Meloni. I mean, she is the leader of a party that, to my understanding, is sort of the most openly connected to its, you know, fascist origins of the post war period, and that that’s what she, you know, in effect, represents this kind of break with the post fascist Italian past, and but she seems to have kind of moderated reviews, or at least what she, you know, says in public, is not so obviously connected to some sort of fascist past. And I guess you know, at some level, the question is, you know, in what respects is Meloni, you know, to be understood with that rubric, I mean, there was a debate here in the United States not long before the election about, you know, whether Trump was a fascist or not, and that, I have a lot of problems with that kind of designation. But in any case, you know, what does it mean to say that she’s kind of openly connected? The party is called the Fratelli D’Italia, which refers basically, openly, to the men, the brothers of Italy, rather than, you know, women. So could you talk a little bit about, you know what her election and her, you know, her Prime Ministership? You know what it represents for contemporary Italy?

Mattia Ferraresi 

Sure. I think the relationship with the Meloni and Meloni’s party with fascist truth, of course, is a complicated one. It’s a complicated one because on one hand, you have, clearly they, they kept and they still represent what I may call a fascist atmosphere. It means like a sort of cultural references underlying concepts are drawn from the fascist history. At the same time, we have to acknowledge, I think it’s fair to acknowledge, that that party went through a number from the post fascist Movimento Social Italiano, MSI, which was the really the heir of the fascist party after the war, there were, like at least two other major changes in every change. Of course, you have, like a sort of a step toward moderation and refusal of certain past ideas, and finally and mid 90s. So Maloney was a young girl, a young woman. At that point, there was finally famous, what has been made famous trip from the leader of the far right party the time to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv acknowledging fascism was part of the absolute evil, which was like a very big deal. So I do think it’s fair to keep the two things together. There is a fascist atmosphere and a sort of symbols are thrown out there at the same time, politically, there was a long journey, I think, that cannot be completely overlooked. And in order to understand that, I think we have to look at the policy and the policies, you can tell that there are certain things when it comes to immigration, definitely, and a certain nationalistic rhetoric, pretty strong, pretty strong. But yeah, but you can argue that there are many patriotic countries with strong sort of nationalistic rhetoric, so that that part, of course, remind us to those roots right at the same time, there are other issues in which, for example, fascism in Italy was very mean, the idea of the strong state and having, like, sort of the central state controlling the economy, for example, this is that, particularly in the agenda of the government. One last example is like the director of the Italian equivalent of the IRS recently resigned because he felt pressure by the government and to put in a position of. Being not liked because it’s like tax collectors, right, which, instead, in the sort of traditional fascist ideas state is strong as that anti taxes is not for like, let’s say fair, free market. So Meloni is like a, is like a blend, if we look at the policy of all those elements, and it’s a mixed bag, definitely. But if you ask me, I think ultimately those fascist policies or fascist core has been pretty much diluted into a more generic conservative ideas, whole set of ideas.

John Torpey 

Right. I mean, just to put this out there, I suppose. I mean, seems to me there are two fundamental things that distinguish our context from the context of, you know, what we might call historical fascism, and that was that, you know, historical fascism arose or came to power, in any case, in the aftermath of a major war that killed millions of people in Europe. And, you know, had to tend to economic problems and that sort of thing. And the other thing is that this is not a response to a sort of threat from the left. I mean, historically, that’s what fascism was all about, it was a response to the rise of communism and socialism and, to some degree, anarchism. And you know, it’s just not the kind of context politically that we’re talking about today. I mean, the left is, seems to me relatively weak by comparison to, you know, in those days. And there’s, you know, no violence in the streets, really, it’s just a very different context, it seems to me. But in a way, that gets me back to the question I wanted to ask. And you know, you talked about the stars aligning for Giorgia Meloni, you know. And I guess the question basically is, you know, what is Trump’s reelection do for the parties like Meloni’s or like Viktor Orbàn, or, you know, what’s going on in the far right on in Germany and France, even now, to some extent, in the UK, you know, how do you see Trump’s election affecting the prospects of those parties?

Mattia Ferraresi 

Definitely a boost. There’s no doubt about that is boosting those, those factions that are that are growing already. So there is definitely a wave I think we have, in the EU context of the EU in seven or eight countries at this point, far right parties that are involved in a coalition, so they are in a position of power, which is like, absolutely, it’s very significant, right? So you have this wave fueled by many factors, immigration being one of them, a sort of recession in some countries, and economic concern being another fear of like competition from China being another so, so you have that you have that, that is sort of growing independently from Trump, because they happened when Trump was not in power, and then you have Trump legitimizing that. But what I think is different compared to the first mandate of Trump in 2016 is that that this time around, trumpism or that brand of far right nationalism, is a stable force in the American politics is sort of, I think there was a realignment Trump in 2016 it was treated mostly, I think, wrongly, as an anomaly, a sort of like a blip in history, we’re gonna fix it. And then I think Biden victory in 2020 provided that sort of a false sense of comfort, that sort of the anomaly was over, and so the history was back on track, basically. I think that was all like, sort of like a big illusion, and proved to be sort of a very parent ethical experience. And so you have now a different Trump, which is a Trump that is supported by half of the Silicon Valley, supported by Elon Musk, is supported by a diverse coalition, both of voters and allies, and supporters, in terms of donors, in terms of constituencies. So it is a moral Trump at the very beginning, early stage of his first mandate, was like a basically disruptor and people. Like Orbàn in Europe, we’re happy to go to dinner with him, but not many other, not many other. Now it’s very different. A lot of people want to sit down with Trump, not just because they have to, but because they think they can share something politically right right, and so and so, I think for those movements, it’s a huge moment of sort of stabilization and being legitimized and being part of sort of the political culture, and like the protagonists of a political realignment that is happening in very much an analogy with what’s happening in the States, I think. And one, one more thing, though, I think the conservatives, the GOP and the conservative movement in general, and Maga movement and the whole whole Maga world, did a a pretty remarkable job while people were now looking in establishing its presence in Europe in a very meaningful way with grassroots campaign, if we think what the GOP and the conservative movement did and is doing in Hungary, using that as a lab for testing policies to making cultural exchanges. You have plenty of Americans, intellectual professors, conservative pundits that move to Hungary in position of being like fellows and being like leading think tank and stuff like that. This is what I call a sort of the equivalent you can say, of what the conservative movement did, for example, on judges and through, for example, the Federalist Society and vehicles like that. They did it in Europe, very effectively, very effectively, in a way that Democrats were not able to at the very grassroots level, with a focus on spreading ideas and sort of building a strong network that is now paying off, is now paying off. So you add that network that nobody, or yeah, people knew, but nobody thought it was particularly significant. Now it is a network of people that are basically in power or very close to power in Europe, and they are legitimized by Trump and and his people from the US. So those network of like loose intellectuals, and now it’s a network of power, essentially. And is this sort of being reflected in politics at the European level, at the level the European Parliament? I think so. Because what you have there is an interesting phenomenon that is a polarization even within the far right. So you have the family led, ideally led by Orbàn, with Marine Le Pen, they now rebranded as patriots, that is becoming more more extreme. And then the fault line here is the position of Russia that, that’s a big difference there. So this is like part of those parties that have an inclination to be in favor of Putin or not particularly supportive of Ukraine, and then you have Meloni and another, another movement, and especially the Polish conservatives and Spanish conservatives, far right, I should better say, gravitating around DCR, which is the party of conservative and reformist, as is called. So it’s a mixed bag of far right and more conventional, conventional right. But the combination of those two forces is pretty significant. Is pretty big right now, it’s it’s a huge slice of the of the political parliament. And between those two families, there are differences. Yes, there are a lot of, like, analogies and a lot of alliances, and a lot of people that might not see the world the same way when it comes to Russia and Ukraine, but they do see the world the same way when it comes to immigration, for instance. So you, like, the net effect is that you have, despite not having a single far right group represented the European Parliament the far right people are more and more representative and influential. And I think those network I was mentioning has been working a lot in order to reduce those those kind of thinking, or like, boost this kind of ideas, not at the level of Hungary or Poland, but in Brussels as well.

John Torpey 

It’s fascinating. I mean, in an earlier period of an upsurge of right wing populism, 25 years ago, I mean, people talked about the idea of a kind of nationalist international, which obviously sounds like an oxymoron, but you know, you’re seem to be describing a kind of arrangement where different parties from different countries, you know, are nationalist in orientation, but they’re learning from each other. They’re chain exchanging ideas. They’re building ties and alliances and networks and that sort of thing. And it’s very interesting development. So on the side, maybe of those who are less enthusiastic about, you know, the return of Donald Trump, I, you know, was very struck by the by the events connected with the reopening of the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris last weekend. And Trump, obviously was there. And what was striking to me was how, you know, generously and warmly he seemed to be received by Emmanuel Macron, and Volodymyr Zelensky seemed, you know, somewhat less enthusiastic about the conversations they were having. But I’m just curious, you know how you expect European leaders to respond? I mean, there’s this sort of indelible photograph of Trump elbowing aside the Montenegrin president, or whatever exactly he was Prime Minister at a meeting of, I’ve forgotten the 20 I guess. And you know the responses to his claims or threats about imposing tariffs on goods coming from elsewhere, I mean, prompted Justin Trudeau to get on a plane and go have dinner with Trump in Mar a Lago to guess to smooth the waters, but very quickly, Claudia Sheinbaum, the recently elected president of Mexico, you know, sort of threatened counter terrorists and essentially a trade war. So I just wonder, you know, how do you think people, the heads of state governments in Europe will respond to him.

Mattia Ferraresi 

I think they will respond, uh, paradoxically, I think not, not in a bad way, not in a bad way. I think there is a clear sense that they all leaders. They had to, they have to stomach Trump, even if they don’t like him, and then they’ll like his policies, but because France and Germany are so much in a political crisis, even more, so they will have to sort of deal with it. And the reason widespread concern when it comes to, of course, free trade, especially car manufacturing and EV This is, of course, in everybody’s mind, and especially in Germany’s mind. So I think there is a an eagerness to sit at the table. So I think Macron wanting to sort of being proactive and playing that part, I mean, part is sort of his personality, for sure. Part is deep, deep, deep political crisis in which he finds himself. Part of it is that I see people rushing to sit at the table with Trump in order to do what? That’s a different question. And I think different European leaders have different ideas. And I think there are two main, big, big group of ideas, big, two big approaches. One is trying to people who are convinced that they can see make Trump sit at the table with the European Union through the EU Commission, which, as I said, is kind of like in terms of policies, is kind of moving to the right, so that that could help, that could help. And another group I think, is thinking differently, is thinking in trumpster. So it’s like we gotta sit down at the table in order to negotiate better deals for ourselves in a very sort of nationalistic approach, which I personally think is ultimately a mistake and a very short sighted thing, but I think those leaders are betting on the fact Trump is going to play that card, that Trump is not really meaning to start like global trade wars, but is threatening to do that as a negotiating. Means in order to get better condition, and he wants to deal bilaterally, and so which every, each single state, one like, have, like good conditions or like, negotiating the specific terms for for everything. So I think there are leaders that have this in mind particularly, and they will be, I can, I can tell, and I think they will act, in a way, be extremely inclined to sit down with Trump in that perspective, to get a good deal, ultimately, to get a good deal. And they think Trump is gonna, is gonna be playing that, because that’s what Trump is about. There’s one thing though that I want to point out that happened recently that I think may be revealing in a way, or we might see something, which is the EU agreement, commercial agreement with Mercosur. So it’s like alliance of states of Latin America, but pretty significant in terms of commerce for the European Union. They had like and it went not, not very much noticed this. This, this piece of news. And I think instead, it was significant, because partly it can be read as one of the last attempt of the European Union to sign a deal before Trump arrives, before the trade wars. This, it sounded like a lot, and there was big disagreement between France and Germany on that specific on that specific thing, and they sort of rushed to sign that off before the storm, all right, basically, I think this is was, in a way, a sign that, okay, this is the last, maybe not the last, but it’s sort of a significant thing we do as a union, because what’s going to happen from January 20 on is going to be way more focused on bilateral negotiations.

John Torpey 

 Right. So, it sounds like you’re not convinced that the sort of tariffs, whatever the wave of tariffs that Trump has been talking about is actually going to happen. And, I mean, it gets into these questions about, you know, do you pay attention to what he says or what he does or and it’s just very hard often to know, I mean, how much of what he says he’s actually going to do. But then there are those who insist, you know you have to pay attention to what he says, Because authoritarians will tell you what they’re going to do, and they tell you over and over again, and then they do it. But that’s, I think, less clear, less obvious to me, in any case. And then there’s this whole business about his critics taking him literally, but not seriously, and his fans taking him seriously, but not literally. I mean, how do you, how do you sort out these different ways of, kind of thinking about him? And because, you know, the tariff thing seems so obviously, you know, likely to produce, you know, inflation, that is, in a way, just what, what just got him elected because his base, you know, seems to have been largely, or at least very frequently, motivated by annoyance about the cost of living in the United States. And so, you know, the question is, I mean, it seems to me that the tariff claims threats anyway, are a sign that Trump has, you know, completely transformed the GOP and the Republican Party. And you know, this is no longer a Reaganite, sort of more or less libertarian sort of organization. It’s something else. But there are limits to how much of this kind of thing you can do and still have a successful economy. And I would think that Republicans, the other Republicans in the party, would be concerned about that, because it’s a you know, relates to their political survival after Trump. So anyway, sorry, I’m going on, but tell me what you think. How seriously should we take some of the claims that he makes, and particularly the ones about tariffs?

Mattia Ferraresi 

That’s the big question, I think, is is in everybody’s mind, and there’s now, I’m afraid there’s no clear answer on that. And part of me thinks that Trump should be taken literally, because most of the time it did a very close version of what is sad at the same time on specifically on tariff, which I consider, personally the single most dangerous policy for for American people, that is putting. Forward, because I think it’s gonna, as you said, is gonna damage e, exactly the people that Trump claims to protect first, and it’s gonna be immediate. You can feel inflation like right away is that it’s not something theoretical. Is very, very, extremely, extremely clear and real and true, and as we know, through the election so, so on that specific thing, despite the fact, or like, taking into account the fact that he’s been very vague about what exactly theorist means and what kind of theory, how much with who this is like, unclear. Has been saying a range of things. This is the one thing I am skeptical that is going to follow what it says. Literally, I maybe just wish for thinking I’m not sure, and I’m deluding myself, probably, probably, probably at the same time, it seems to me, as you articulated the impact of it would be so damaging for Trump’s cause and very much Trump’s pace, that it seemed like more a negotiating strategy than than a posture, having said that, having said that we have to take into account the context. And the context is Trump introduced now the the larger, even larger context is that Barack Obama was elected in 2008 on a platform of disengaging with the wars. And one of the early slogan of Barack Obama, when he went to the Midwest and the Rust Belt, was by American, by American, was a thing, was a very and there was like a fair deal of protectionist measure put in place to do what Obama term nation building a home at that point. So so the the and of course, Trump extended that with with a number of tariffs and regulation that has not been taken out. I think Biden approved or, or or did not take out. I think 80 or 90% of what Trump did in terms of tariffs. So we already are in a context in which tariffs are there, and there is a protectionist sort of outlook in the commerce policy in place already. So we’re not starting from, you know, a free a free trade environment. We were starting off from, from a from a different place. So on that thing, I’m personally skeptical that it can do something extreme and dramatic when it comes to tariffs, especially toward Europe. China is, of course, is the main thing, and it’s also a different thing. There are many factors there. But then you never know. Then one day, one day you think, he’s starting a trade war, the other day invites Xi Jinping at the inauguration. So hard to say, no?

John Torpey 

Hard to say indeed. I mean, the difference is that we have some historical experience with tariffs and trade wars, and you know, presumably, he has advisors who can remember what happened in the 1930s which may not be familiar to him, but the consequences were disastrous, and so one imagines that somebody would point that out to him, if he I mean, I understand, he sort of wants to support the or say things that Maga base will like, but this is really not they may think that it’s going to do them a lot of good, but that’s not at all clear. So in any case, thanks very much for a really informative discussion. I want to thank Mattia Ferraresi for sharing his insights about European responses to the reelection of Donald Trump. Look for International Horizons on the New Books Network and remember to subscribe and rate International Horizons on Spotify and Apple Podcast. I want to thank Claire Centofanti for her technical assistance, as well as to acknowledge Duncan McKay for sharing his song International Horizons as the theme music for the show. This is John Torpey saying thanks for joining us, and we look forward to having you with us for the next episode of International Horizons.