The victims of severe injustice, but no other group in society, are allowed to employ disruption and violence to seek political change. This article argues for this conclusion from within Rawlsian political liberalism, which, however, has been criticised for allegedly imposing public reason’s suffocating norms of civility on the oppressed. It develops a novel view of the applicability of public reason in non-ideal circumstances – the ‘no self-sacrificed view’ – that is focused on the excessive costs of following public reason when suffering from severe injustice. On this view, those treated in what Rawls describes as less than a reasonably just way are relieved of the duty of public reason and therefore entitled to employ disruption and violence. Turning to the requirements that actually apply to the oppressed, the article also shows that, when properly developed, political liberalism offers original and nuanced normative guidance on how to fight severe injustice uncivilly. 

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