In this episode of International Horizons, RBI director John Torpey interviews Nathalie Tocci, director of the Institute of International Affairs in Rome, about the implications of Donald Trump’s second administration for Europe. The discussion explores how Trump’s approach to foreign policy—characterized by protectionism, nationalism, and disdain for multilateralism—affects European politics, particularly in relation to NATO, trade, and the far-right’s growing influence. Prof. Tocci highlights how Trump’s return emboldens nationalist movements across the continent, especially in countries like Italy, where leaders such as Giorgia Meloni now feel freer to express their ideological stances. The conversation also examines the evolving European response to Trump, from initial panic to a mix of wishful thinking and cautious strategizing, particularly regarding the future of NATO and the war in Ukraine.

Transcript

John Torpey 

With one week of his new administration under our seat belts, we have at least a little data about what’s going to happen in Trump’s second term. He wants to negotiate a deal, he says, with Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine. He has a defense secretary whose main experience lies in having been a weekend anchor on Fox News, and his nominee for Director of National Intelligence has no relevant experience beyond what she might have acquired from a stint in Congress. According to Fareed Zarkaria, coming out of Davos, European leaders are more confident than last time that they can work with Trump. Yet Trump is rattling sabers, or at least maps about acquiring Greenland and repossessing the Panama Canal. So what should we expect of Trump’s foreign policy in the next four years? Welcome to International Horizons, the podcast of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies that brings scholarly and diplomatic expertise to bear on our understanding of a wide range of international issues. My name is John Torpey, and I’m director of the Ralph Bunche Institute at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and we’re fortunate to have with us today. Natalie Tocci, director of the Institute of International Affairs in Rome, a professor at the School ofTransnational Governance at the European University Institute in Florence, and an honorary professor at the University of Tubingen. She has served as a special advisor to EU high representatives Federica Mogherini, a one time guest of the podcast, I’ll say, and Joseph Borrell. ProfessorTocci has held research positions at the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels, the Transatlantic Academy in Washington, and the European University Institute in Florence, and she’s taught at the College of Europe in Bruges. She has written a number of books, most recently, A Green and Global Europe published by Polity Press in 2022. So thanks so much for being with us today, Natalie Tocci.

Nathalie Tocci 

It’s a pleasure being with you.

John Torpey 

Thank you very much. So, as I said in the introduction, we’ve now had a week or so, a little more. Of course, there was a pre inauguration part of the administration. It seems we’ve had a week or more of the second Trump administration. It generally, I would say, seems a lot less chaotic and more focused on its goals, for better or worse. And as a European foreign affairs expert, what would you say? What do you make of what we’ve seen so far?

Nathalie Tocci 

Well, firstly, I would agree with you that we’ve seen a far higher level of sort of political and ideological coherence, and, in a sense, competence in and determination and kind of pushing for a particular agenda. And I think in terms of what that agenda is and how this plays out in Europe, I think we have both old and new elements, and both the old and the new really have very deep repercussions on Europe. So as far as the old is concerned, by old, what I mean is features in Trump one that you know, perhaps in a less coherent way, were present and are back, in a sense, with the vengeance. In Trump two are everything that falls into the boxes of protectionism, nationalism, on the one hand, and obviously sort of connected to that, an essential disdain for multilateralism and international alliances and partnerships, and obviously both of these sets of things have deep implications for Europe, obviously, as far as protectionism is concerned. Here, the big story is the possibility, the probability, of a transatlantic trade war, where, in a sense, we were already there back in 2016. However, on the one hand, is saying there’s this greater determination on the part of Donald Trump, but also there’s a more kind of weak and fragmented Europe, so it’s easier to play divided role compared to what it was back in 2016, perhaps this is something that we can come back to later. But so I think you know that protectionism and the implications for transatlantic trade war obviously has very deep implications for Europe. Alongside this, there’s this question of, you know, Trump exiting from the multilateral order, which is really one of the defining features of what the EU thinks. You know, how it thinks of the world and how it thinks of its place in the world. And again, here, you know, whereas back in 2016, as the US temporarily, so we thought, exited from that multilateral order, the EU kind of, very much led by Angela Merkel, in a sense, sort of wanted to step in and take the matter of that leadership of the liberal international order, the rules based order. Now it’s not really quite clear who in Europe would take that leadership. And then we add the new, but I think the new has to do on the one hand, with this nexus between Trump, the future of American democracy and how this plays out on Europe and European democracy, because we know, and we see a Trump which is literally back in the benches, right, and, you know, aiming at his political opponents, aiming at the judiciary, aiming at the traditional media. So a lot of what we’re seeing and hearing, especially is kind of straight out of the authoritarian people. Now, regardless of what actually happens in America, I think the point, as far as Europe is concerned is, again, how does this play out in Europe, given that, you know, there are a number of countries, my ownincluded, in which you do have the far right on the rise, the far right in power, either leading or in a minority position within a coalition government. And so you know, to the extent to which that authoritarian people is legitimized by Donald Trump, and this is not just some sort of weird thing that Viktor Orban does, it is something that, again, could embolden sort of far right populist leaders in Europe. And then the very final point, which gets us to Greenland, but I think is a broader story, is the way, you know, sort of Trump two’s vision of the world. And it seems to me that this is a vision that essentially says: I understand, and I don’t even physically want the US, you know, I understand that we’ve gone beyond the sort of world of US hegemony. And I understand that this is a world of great powers, and I think that’s it’s okay for great powers to have their respective spheres of influence. And so actually, although, of course, you know me America, I remain in a competitive relationship with China, but I acknowledge it’s great power status, and I even accept the fact that the Chinese, or perhaps even the Russians, may have sort of legitimate interests and concerns about their spheres of influence, and me the United States too. I want my sphere of influence. And obviously a sphere of influence is, by definition, a surrounding region, and presumably areas which were once upon a time, the allies of the purpose, which I think you know, brings us to the very specific Greenland story as far as Europe is concerned. But more broadly, you know, the way in which Trump understands Europe is less through the preserve of an alliance of more or less equals, but rather through an imperial lens in which you basically want to have you know, you want your colonies, right? You want your, as I said, your influence, and so actually you want to weaken those allies and those partners. Right. I mean, as it happens, I was just listening to Yasha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama ruminate on the possibility that Trump might simply occupy Greenland. Now, that would obviously be a huge step in the wrong direction, but that’s not to say it’s inconceivable. I mean, can you imagine such a thing? Well, what would you say would be the consequences? I mean, obviously, he’s never been particularly interested in NATO. He’s not really, you know, he thinks of Europe as a bunch of small countries that, you know, I mean, Greenland’s interesting to him I think in part because he’s a real estate mogul and, you know, likes the idea of a big island with American flags on it. So, I mean, can you imagine such a thing? And I mean, obviously the implications for China and Taiwan are massive. But anyway, your thoughts on that? Yeah. I mean, okay, if the question is, can I imagine, or do I think that it’s probable to see US boots marching into Greenland, I would probably still say it’s not likely. However, I do think what is very likely is that various mixes of coercion and coercive instruments, including both the economic and the military, will be exerted to coerce a change of the status quo in Greenland, perhaps even leveraging the fact that Greenland itself, as we know, is in a complicated relationship with Denmark. And so in a sense, may, you know, the top may leverage and the cracks in that particular wall, right, to, you know, propel further than you know, the coercion onto Greenland. Now what would actually happen, I think, to an extent, depends, obviously, on what the European reaction. So let’s imagine, for the sake of argument, that Denmark invokes Article Five, right? So Denmark invoking Article Five when you know, because of an attack on, you know, of the majority shareholder in NATO would essentially mean the end of NATO, right? And so presumably Denmark would not invoke Article Five. And the question then becomes, firstly, so what does Denmark actually do? Does it do nothing? You know, does it sort of, you know, simply, kind of wish the problem away, and the other Europeans simply do nothing. I mean, you know, this is the other extreme right. And, you know, by doing nothing, obviously the thought process would be, well, you know, at this point in time we have more urgent fish to fry. And really that has to do with Ukraine, and retaining US, the US somehow engaged in Ukraine. And so we simply cannot antagonize Trump on Greenland. And so basically, you know,Europe would have said is, we just, you know, basically, to nothing. And that’s the other extreme, which would also kill NATO, I think, for the reasons that you were suggesting, right? Because essentially what this would and it would just kill NATO, it would kill international law, right? That is in a pretty kind of, you know, sort of sorry state, as is, because essentially, you know what would stop Taiwan, you know, China invading Taiwan, which is not even a recognized state, right? So, you know, it is clear what the repercussions of both those extremes are. I think Europeans at the moment are in this predicament in which they, deeply after the call the Trump had with Mette Frederiksen, the Danish Prime Minister that went very badly. Um, Europe now has moved away from the pure wishing the problem away state of mind. I mean, it is clear that you know this narrative of you know, we should take Trump seriously, but not Trump literally. Only can go so far, because there comes a point where you actually even have to take him literally. So I think they’ve moved, right, away from simply ignoring the problem, but they’re not yet at the other extreme of, kind of, you know, reacting for all. And I think they’re still hoping that in, sort of, you know, through a behind the scenes way, because they’re a bigger fish to fry in Ukraine, on Iran, Gaza, etc, that somehow all this is not going to come to the worst. But frankly speaking, if it does come to the worst, the tragedy is that there is actually very little that Europeans could do to save NATO and to save the international order.

John Torpey 

Yeah. Well, alas, I fear that’s the case. I mean, let’s face it, he now has control over nuclear weapons, something, something that nobody’s really that I’ve heard talked about very much. It’s maybe best not thought about, I don’t know. But what, back to one of your points about the trade war and the tariffs, I mean, assuming, let’s say, a better case, if not better best case scenario? I mean, you know, I’m no economist, but what I’ve heard and read suggests that tariffs, you know, may have their own blowback effects, in effect, and that the you know, tariffs that he’s talking about would, you know, increase the price of imports, obviously, that’s the point of them, and that would have negative repercussions for the economic well being of, you know, his base, and so I wonder. And you know, the other thing is that he’s also always very concerned about the stock market. So yesterday must have been a rough day. He’s always concerned about the stock market as a measure of his, you know, success. So I wonder whether the, you know, the bluster about tariffs, I mean, there’s always this question, do you pay attention to what he says or what he does? I mean, I’m inclined at this point, having heard so much kind of nonsense over the years, to sort of say, well, we got to pay attention to what he does. But of course, some of those things, once they’re done, they’re done, and that won’t be so good. But I mean, on the tariffs question, I think there’s some reason to think that, you know, the blowback will keep him from doing the worst, at least.

Nathalie Tocci 

That’s right, but I don’t think that we should necessarily, necessarily assume the fact that, given that it makes no economic sense, given that it would hurt us citizens, but therefore he wouldn’t do it, that’s possible, but won’t necessarily play out in the same way, as you know you were giving the example of the stock market and the crash. And I thought it was actually quite interesting, the way he reacted to it, you know, I mean, the fact that, basically, China has done this, you would have thought that this would have really triggered him, right, in a kind of negative way, and it didn’t,right? They almost triggered him in a positive way. And I think this goes back to this issue of actually not only acknowledgingbut accepting a world of great powers in which, you know, China upping its game on AI is, I mean, not not okay, but is predictable, and it’s something that US should engage in. It’s not necessarily a bad thing. So there’s an element of kind of respect for rivals and total disdain for your colonies. And obviously this brings back Europe, but back to the trade story. I think, as, yeah, so that there is a well down there in which, you know, he comes to his economic senses of this doesn’t happen. But I think we should take very seriously the proposition that actually, so far, when faced with the choice, you know, a protectionist of the closure, be it on migration or on trade that may have inflationary effects on the US, so either doing it or not doing it, he’s choosing to go ahead and doing it. So how does this then play out on Europe? Now in principle, you know, obviously trade is a competence at EU level, and so although the United States has the capacity to hurt the European Union more than the European Union has the capacity to hurt the United States, in the EU acts united as it does on trade, the level of potential harm that the EU can inflict upon the United States is not insignificant. So presumably, what Trump will try to do is the undoable, right? I mean, he’s going to try and play the Biden rule, and he’s going to reach out to his friends in Europe, beginning with my Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and perhaps offer some sweet deals or trade. Now, in theory, essentially, if he reaches out to individual countries, their response should be, well, thanks very much but this is an EU competence. You can’t negotiate with me. You’ve got to negotiate with Ursula up in Brussels, right? But then this was why, and I come back to this point I was making about, you know, the interplay between what happens in democracy in the United States and what happens in Europe and being connected. If in Europe we had a Europe in which liberals democracy was strong, and commitment to Europe and the European Union was strong, I wouldn’t be too worried. But in this Europe in which we have our little Trumps and Trumpets all over the place, it is far more likely that some of these countries will actually take those sweet deals and then directly end up not only not strengthening Europe, but actually bringing down the entire European edifice.

John Torpey 

Well, that’s certainly a discouraging diagnosis, but again, it’s not necessarily obviously the wrong one. But I am curious what you would say, I know you’re sort of more of a foreign policy person, but what you would say about the implications of Trump’s return to Office for European right politics and and more, more, especially for for Italian politics, which, I mean, I think I said in my note to you earlier that, you know, I wasn’t very impressed by the idea that Trump is a fascist, but I do think he’s authoritarian. And, you know, his reascendancy to Office gives that all a good name at some level, for those who you know are on that side of the political aisle. So to talk a little bit about what that implications are.

Nathalie Tocci 

Yeah, again, I think, you know, it’s important to look at how the context has changed. If we compare 2016 to 2025 you know, back in 2016 Trump arrived, well, not only were his authoritarian streaks less evident than what they are today, but he was elected in the United States at a time in which in Europe, we were way past the peak of what I would define as the first wave of nationalist populism. You know that first wave really began after the global financial crisis, the eurozone crisis, it peaked with the migration crisis in 2015 and then it started going down. So 2016, 17, 18, through to the first year, I would say, the Ukraine war, it was basically on a downward trend. And the fact that it was on that downward trend essentially meant that the Trump Effect, rather than strengthening populists in Europe, had the opposite effect. They almost kind of reawakened Europe, you know, about its sort of liberal identity. I mean, you know it was, I was gonna say, you know, Merkel standing in for the liberal international order. Today, the context is very different, because Trump two gets elected at a time in which the nationalist, populist way that Europe is on its upward curve again, and not only do we now have, well, seven, actually, no, yeah, seven governments out of 27 in which the far right is in government, we have another three probably on the way if we think about Austria, the Czech Republic, and possibly Romania as well. So essentially, by the end of this year, we could be in a situation in which 10 out of 27 have far right governments, in which in Germany, the far right, presumably, is going to be the second party. Who knows what’s going to happen in France and how long the Bayrou government is going to last there? But it’s a very, very different context. In that different context, Trump arriving has, I think, not only an emboldening effect, you know, those that are already in power feel less constrained. Yeah. I mean, I think about my own Prime Minister, she spent the first couple of years once she rose to power, behaving right as a good Western citizen, standing for Ukraine, not being too obnoxious about Europe and all the rest of it. But of course, all this was really premised on Biden being in the White House and with Trump, then someone like Meloni can play the role of the good Western citizen, right, by actually being deeply anti European. Because, of course, if the first Western citizen, I mean the United States, goes that way, then more it’s going to follow people like Meloni sort of going that route as well. You know, I thought it was quite interesting, for instance, you know, as a couple of weeks ago Meloni gave her sort of, you know, long annual uh, press conference at the beginning of the year, and, um, she latched out in defense of Elon Musk. She latched out against George Soros, right, which, as we know, is, you know, one of the favorite boogeymans of the populist far right now, I said to myself, she would not have dared speak this way a year ago or two years ago. So she obviously feels emboldened. She feels that there’s more space for her opinions, which probably never changed, to be expressed. So I think it both grounds an evolving effect on the far right, and it increases the temptations on the center right to open the floodgates, basically, and kind of allow the far right here, which I think has been the other side of the coin, which explains this rise of the far right. Although is not the rise of the far right itself, it’s the normalizing effect that the center rights, opening towards the far right has had, and again, that is something which Trump may and probably is going to encourage to happen.

John Torpey 

Right. So I started out, I think, by mentioning something I had seen Fareed Zakaria say, which is basically that coming out of Davos, the European leaders that were there, you know, had, I guess, told him that they felt like they could, you know, deal with Trump, that he was, you know, maybe a better known quantity this time around, or whatever. I mean, does that surprise you? And I guess the other question I had was, in a sense, you know, you done this before, what are you advising Ursula? What would you advise Ursula von der Leyen to do in the face of this challenge?

Nathalie Tocci 

I think, what the attitude in Europe now is, I think, that the mood a couple of weeks ago was more of a panic mood, and there was the sense, I think, especially related to Ukraine, “Oh, my God, you know, you know, Trump is gonna sort of push Ukraine under the bus.” And that indeed has somewhat subsided. I think the problem was there are two sets of problems in the mental state that we’re in. I mean, the first is the kind of, you know, wishcasting state of mind, right? You know, you want Trump to somehow be manageable, and so you convince yourself that he is manageable, which may end up being, obviously a big mistake. So I think there’s an element of that going on, and then there’s an element of, you know, perhaps we’re no longer in that pure panic and fear mode, but we then reverse into the paradoxically not being anxious enough mode, and therefore not really doing anything, and rather sticking heads in the sand a little bit too much. And I think, you know, sort of that’s and these things go in ways. But I would say at this point in time, the snapshot of today is still one relative paralysis, less driven by panic and more driven by maybe complacency, and both of these things, obviously, I think are big mistakes.

John Torpey 

And what do you expect to happen on the Ukraine front? I mean, there’s Trump says he wants to make a deal, but it’s not clear Putin is prepared to do that. How do you read how do you read that?

Nathalie Tocci 

Um, so I that there are kind of three possible scenarios out there and and again, you know, the one which I think is least likely is the one that we want to believe is the most likely one. So the scenario which I think is least likely is one in which a negotiation perhaps starts, and eventually it is Putin that kind of gives the middle finger to Trump, and Trump gets really kind of, you know, slighted by this, and doubles down in support for Ukraine, and eventually Ukraine sort of ends the war in victory. I don’t think that we should obviously exclude that scenario, but I somehow don’t think it’s very likely. So this kind of leaves two other scenarios, one scenario in which a negotiation actually ends, indeed with a truce. I mean not a peace agreement, but a truce. And there, you know, it is either a truce which simply prepares for the next round of fighting or, but this is mainly up to Europeans, it is a truce that is somehow transformed into something more or less sustainable, and therefore more Korean-like, if you see what I mean. But this would require very significant European presence, true presence, I mean in Ukraine itself, right, as a deterrent for basically that renewed round of Russian aggression. So, you know, that’s a possibility there again. I wouldn’t say it’s the least likely, but I wouldn’t say it’s the most likely either, which then kind of means a third scenario, which is one in which the negotiation starts, it doesn’t actually lead to an agreement, but it doesn’t lead to a failure to a very clearcut Russian middle finger, because Putin would be able to play the game in a more skillful way. And basically, he would drag out the negotiation so they would negotiate, and negotiate and negotiate, and negotiate, of course, in the meantime, the war is going on, right, and at some point, Trump would kind of get bored, right, and look for his Nobel Peace Prize elsewhere, and kind of disengage, not in an abrupt way, but you know, through a very natural process in which, for instance, there wouldn’t be a new US supplemental being passed in Congress on assistance to Ukraine. And so there would be this kind of drip, drip, drip, end of US engagement, which I think is probably what Putin is trying to do. And I again, I don’t think that necessarily this is what’s going to happen, but I think that we should take this scenario very seriously, because at this point in time, it actually looks like the most likely and the most dangerous.

John Torpey  Right. Well, we’ve got lots of things to worry about, it seems to me, but thanks for the your thoughts on the situation of Europeans in the face of the second Trump administration. That’s it for today’s episode. I want to thank Nathalie Tocci for sharing her insights about European responses to the early days of the second Trump Administration. Look forInternational Horizons on the New Books Network, and remember to subscribe and rate International Horizons on Spotify and Apple Podcasts. I want to thank Claire Centofanti for her technical assistance, as well as to acknowledge Duncan McKay for sharing his song International Horizons as the theme music for the show. This is John Torpey saying thanks for joining us, and we look forward to having you with us for the next episode of international horizons.